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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
validation of written qualification tests through correlation with scores on
written training course exams, people who have good verbal skills will
achieve high scores on both tests regardless of actual job-specific ability. 59
The majority, viewing a minimum level of communicative skill as practi-
cally essential to police work and accepting the legitimate need for recruit
training, determined that a positive relationship between test scores and
training course performance was sufficient validation. The Court found
this approach a "much more sensible construction" of job relatedness and
"not foreclosed" by Griggs or Albemarle.' However, the Court's will-
ingness to forego proof that the test was predictive of actual job perform-
ance was based upon judicial cognizance 61 of the necessity of police
training programs. This understanding may be lacking in other contexts.
Washington v. Davis is a pivotal case in the areas of equal protection
and employment discrimination as defined by federal statutes. In evaluat-
ing future claims of unconstitutional racial discrimination, courts will no
longer reason backwards from adverse impact to illicit purpose-nor will
they avoid finding a discriminatory purpose by characterizing purpose as
irrelevant. The decision also creates doubt whether the Court shares the
EEOC's views on acceptable methods of test validation although the
Court's brief treatment of the issue leaves few concrete impressions.
Robert G. Nida
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES:
THE NEW SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A successful tort plaintiff sought to satisfy his judgment against a
police jury by causing eighty acres owned by that entity but leased for
agricultural purposes to be seized and sold after informal negotiations and
numerous pleas for payment proved unfruitful. The Third Circuit Court of
59. 426 U.S. at 270.
60. Id. at 250-51. This "sensibleness" construction resembles the concept of
construct validity which is demonstrated by examinations structured to measure the
degree to which job applicants have identifiable characteristics that have been
determined to be important in successful job performance. Id. at 247 n.13. The
court of appeals labeled this common sense theory as equivalent to a finding of
construct validity. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 965, (D.C. Cir. 1975).
61. 426 U.S. at 250 (stating that the need for the program seems conceded;
usefulness of minimum verbal skill apparent).
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Appeal held that property owned by a public entity in whatever capacity is
not subject to seizure and sale for satisfaction of judgment, and that
judgments are eligible only out of funds appropriated for payment under
the terms of Article 12, Section 10 of the Louisiana Constitution. Foreman
v. Vermillion Parish Police Jury, 336 So. 2d 986 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1976). 1
Historically, execution of judgments against governmental bodies in
Louisiana differed depending on whether the debtor was a local or state
entity. The courts distinguished property owned by local entities as falling
into either the public or private domain as determined by the use of the
property. 2 Since it was serving no public purpose, private domain property
was often found subject to seizure and sale to satisfy the debts of the local
government entity. For example, rents from buildings leased to individu-
als for profit, 3 certain bonds held by the city,4 and property bought by the
city to donate to a third party 5 were subject to seizure and sale. Public
domain property, however, was considered as "out of commerce" and not
subject to seizure and sale for satisfaction of judgments. 6 Thus, water-
1. The land upon which the plaintiff sought to execute was originally dedi-
cated as a "poor farm" when purchased in 1898. However, since 1910 it had been
leased to individuals for private agricultural purposes. The court could have
avoided confusion of the public and proprietary domains by holding that property
once dedicated to public use does not become a private asset of the corporation
merely because the trustees have failed to administer it according to its public
dedication, and as property held in trust for the public, it could "no more be sold to
satisfy the debts of a state or other political subdivision than can any other trust
property be sold to satisfy the debts of any other trustee." Porter v. Town of Ville
Platte, 158 La. 342, 345, 104 So. 67, 69 (1925); Kline v. Parish of Ascension, 33 La.
Ann. 562 (1881).
2. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 481, 482(2). See J. B. McCrary v. Town of Winnfield,
40 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. La. 1941); Turfitt v. Police Jury, 191 La. 635, 186 So. 52
(1939); American-La France & Foamite Indus., Inc. v. Town of Winnfield, 184 La.
1043, 168 So. 293 (1936); Town of Farmerville v. Commercial Credit Co., 173 La.
43, 136 So. 82 (1931); Porter v. Town of Ville Platte, 158 La. 342, 104 So. 67 (1925).
For a more detailed discussion of the division of public property into the public and
private domains, see A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY §§ 29, 30 in 2 LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 77-86 (1966). See also Yiannopoulos, Common, Public and
Private Things in Louisiana: Civilian Tradition and Modern Practice, 21 LA. L.
REV. 697 (1960).
3. J. B. McCrary v. Town of Winnfield, 40 F. Supp. 427,434 (W.D. La. 1941)
(town rented part of its city hall to private persons for profit).
4. City of New Orleans v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 23 La. Ann. 61 (1871).
5. Edey v. City of Shreveport, 26 La. Ann. 636 (1874).
6. Property in the public domain was considered as owned by the public, and
the governing body only the trustees of such property. See Turfitt v. Police Jury,
191 La. 635, 186 So. 52 (1939); Town of Farmerville v. Commercial Credit Co., 173
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works, 7 courthouses,' jails, 9 taxes' 0 and school grounds" were not subject
to seizure since these were dedicated to public use. 2
Execution against the state was governed primarily by Article 3,
Section 35 of the 1921 Constitution 3 and pursuant legislation. Prior to
amendments, the consitution broadly stipulated that the legislature was to
provide the procedure and effect of judgments rendered against the state or
its agencies. In 1946, the constitution was amended specifically to provide
that money judgments rendered against the state could only be satisfied by
specific legislative appropriation.' 4 However, a 1960 amendment to the
1921 Constitution included all public entities in this appropriation scheme
by stating that "No judgment against the state or any other public body
shall be exigible, payable or paid except out of funds appropriated for
payment thereof."' 5 Thus, the amendment apparently foreclosed the
La. 43, 136 So. 82 (1931); Porter v. Town of Ville Platte, 158 La. 342, 104 So. 67
(1925).
7. See Town of Farmerville v. Commercial Credit Co., 173 La. 43, 136 So. 82
(1931); Porter v. Town of Ville Platte, 158 La. 342, 104 So. 67 (1925).
8. Turfitt v. Police Jury, 191 La. 635, 186 So. 52 (1939).
9. Id. But see McKnight v. Parish of Grant, 30 La. Ann. 361 (1878).
10. Egerton v. Third Municipality of New Orleans, I La. Ann. 435 (1846).
11. City of Monroe v. Ouachita, 172 La. 861, 135 So. 657 (1931).
12. Only occasionally did the courts confuse the two theories and allow proper-
ty in the public domain to be seized and sold by creditors of the public entity. In
McKnight v. Parish of Grant, 30 La. Ann. 361 (1878), the court allowed the
contractor of the parish jail to seize it under his mechanic and builder's lien. This
case has been overruled, but on different grounds. Porter v. Town of Ville Platte,
158 La. 342, 104 So. 67 (1925). A short-lived method for enforcing judgments
against parishes was embodied in an 1869 statute which required judges, when
rendering a money judgment against a parish, to order the assessor of the defendant
parish to assess a tax at a sufficient rate to pay the judgment. The act was in force
only eight years and was repealed in 1877 by La. Acts 1877, No. 57.
13. Even prior to the 1921 Constitution of Louisiana, legislative consent to be
sued did not imply consent to execution against the state. The purpose of adjudica-
tion was "nothing more than to refer to the judiciary the settlement of the questions
of law and fact involved in the claims, and the determination, in the form of a
judgment, of the rights of the parties." The judgment was of no executory force.
Carter v. State, 42 La. Ann. 927, 8 So. 836 (1890). Cf. Mallard v. State, 194 So. 447
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1940).
14. La. Acts 1946, No. 385. Prior to the amendment, the legislature, at the time
of granting permission to sue the state, also designated from which funds the
judgment was to be satisfied, and such "appropriation" was not subject to the veto
of the governor. Regardless of the condition of the budget, when the judgment was
final it had to be satisfied from the pre-designated fund. See McMahon & Miller,
The Crain Myth-A Criticism of the Duree and Stephens Cases, 20 LA. L. REV. 449
(1960) (authors conclude that the purpose of the 1946 amendment was to remedy
this ridiculous situation and to provide for executive veto of the appropriation).
15. La. Acts 1960, No. 621 (emphasis added).
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former practice of seizing and selling private domain property owned by
local public entities. 6
Article 12, Section 10(c) of the 1974 Constitution is similar to the
1960 amendment to the 1921 Constitution in that an appropriation by the
governmental entity against whom judgment is rendered is necessary for
payment of the judgment. 17 The provision of the 1974 Constitution,
however, i's more explicit than the former version. It specifically prohibits
the seizure of any public property or funds owned by a governmental
entity, and further provides that judgments are payable only out of specifi-
cally appropriated funds.' 8
The instant case addressed the issue of whether this prohibition
against seizure encompasses property of both the public and private
domains. The plaintiff argued that a farm, leased for profit by the grand
jury, was property in the private domain, and therefore should be subject
to seizure. The court rejected this contention by finding that the new
constitutional prohibition against seizure applied to all public property in
either the private or public domains.19 The court seems correct, judging
from the transcripts of the 1973 Constitutional Convention and the explicit
language of Article 12, Section 10(c), in holding that no public property is
subject to seizure and sale, and that appropriation by the debtor public
entity is the exclusive manner for payment of judgments rendered against
it.20
The possibility of non-payment by the governmental entities was
appreciated and considered by the Convention in adopting Article 12,
Section 10. In the words of one delegate who expressed a belief voiced
often in the debates concerning payment of judgments, the legislature, "if
16. In a detailed and thorough analysis, the procedure of suits against the state
and effect of judgment against the state under Louisiana Constitution Article 3,
Section 35 (1921) was severely criticized in McMahon and Miller, The Crain Myth-
A Criticism of the Duree and Stephens Cases, 20 LA. L. REV. 449 (1960). The author
of this note found no Louisiana cases after the 1960 amendment to Article 3,
Section 35 in which judgment creditors of a municipality attempted to seize publicly
owned property to satisfy their judgment until the instant case.
17. LA. CONST. art. 12, § 10(c) provides: "The Legislature shall provide a
procedure for suits against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision. It
shall provide for the effect of a judgment, but no public property or public funds
shall be subject to seizure. No judgment against the state, a state agency, or a
political subdivision shall be exigible, payable, or paid except from funds appropri-
ated by the legislature or by the political subdivision against which judgment is
rendered."
18. See note 17, supra.
19. 336 So. 2d 986, 988 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
20. See note 23, infra.
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it chooses to, may appropriate the funds. If it doesn't, too bad." 2 Further,
evidence of a lack of concern for the judgment creditors of public entities
may be adduced from the overwhelming defeat of an amendment which
would have permitted seizure of public property which had been mort-
gaged or hypothecated. 22 Apparently,the intended effect of Article 12,
Section 10(a)-(c) is merely to eliminate the necessity of obtaining legisla-
tive permission to sue in contract or tort, and to empower the legislature to
provide for the effect of judgment subject to the constitutional limitation
against seizure of public property or public funds. 23
In addition to disposing of the former distinction between public and
private domain property insofar as judgment creditors are concerned,
Foreman further illustrates the inherent weakness in the present system.
The legislation enacted pursuant to Article 12, Section 10(c) is inadequate
to deal with the payment of judgments by governmental entities. 24 While
21. See STATE OF LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 VERBATIM
TRANSCRIPTS, July 26 at 42 [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS]. See also id. at 51,
54-55; id., July 27 at 39.
22. Id., July 26 at 85 (29 Yea, 71 No).
23. The original committee proposal had sought to leave any waiver of immuni-
ty to the discretion of the legislature, and likewise leave to it the manner of
executing judgments against the state, its agencies, and political subdivisions.
PROCEEDINGS, July 26 at 31. The first and second proposed amendments both
waived immunity and prohibited seizure of public property, but never reached a
vote. Id. at 32-33. The amendment in whose favor the earlier two were withdrawn
implicitly waived sovereign immunity and stipulated that the legislature should
provide for the effect of judgment but exempted public property from seizure. Id.
at 34. The Convention, concerned that the ambiguous language might be construed
as making the state liable for the debts of municipalities and parishes, and that
public funds in banks might be subject to seizure, defeated the amendment. Id. at
33-60. It had been admitted by proponents of the amendment that there was no
security available to creditors of the state or political subdivisions, as property
would be immune from seizure whether bonded or not. Id. at 35. A subsequent
amendment attempted to remedy this situation by providing that public property
was exempt from seizure except when mortgaged or hypothecated. Id. at 80. The
amendment suffered overwhelming defeat. Id. at 85. Following this defeat, it was
again proposed that the manner of executing judgments be left to the legislature, to
which there were objections that school buses or property owned by the school
boards or parishes could theoretically under such a system be subject to seizure. Id.
at 93, July 27 at 22. A subsequent amendment compromised the convention's
objections by providing specifically that no public property or public funds shall be
subject to seizure, and that judgments are payable only out of funds appropriated
for satisfaction thereof by the legislature or political subdivision against whom
judgment is rendered. The amendment passed. Id., July 27 at 46.
24. LA. R.S. 13:5101-08, 5110, 5111 (Supp. 1975); LA. R.S. 13:5109 (Supp. 1975)
(as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 372).
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constitutionally commissioned to provide for the effect of judgments and
to establish procedures for instituting suits against the state and political
subdivisions, the legislature has only effectively provided for the pro-
cedural aspects.2 5 The statute dealing with payment is ineffective because
it merely tracks the language of Article 12, Section 10 (c),26 thus en-
couraging nonpayment by public entities. By arbitrarily refusing to pay
judgments for which they have been held liable, governmental entities can
cause the waiver of immunity from suit and liability of Article 12, Section
10(a) to become only a waiver of immunity from suit.2 7
The plaintiff in Foreman posed an equal protection issue which the
majority dismissed with neither citation nor discussion. It merits consid-
eration because arbitrary payment and nonpayment of judgments may lead
to serious constitutional problems. Concededly, citizens do not have a
constitutional right to sue a sovereign which does not waive its sovereign
immunity. 28 However, once the state has extended the benefit of recovery
25. The statutes provide that no jury trial is available to plaintiffs in suits
against the state, see Carter v. City of New Orleans, 327 So. 2d 488 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1976), and that proper venue for suits in tort and contract is where the cause of
action arises or in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court.
26. LA. R.S. 13:5109(B) (Supp. 1975) provides that: "Any judgment rendered
in any suit filed against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision, or any
compromise reached in favor of the plaintiff or plaintiffs in any such suit shall be
exigible, payable, and paid only out of funds appropriated for that purpose by the
legislature, if the suit was filed against the state or a state agency, or out of funds
appropriated for that purpose by the named political subdivision, if the suit was
filed against a political subdivision."
27. See Foreman v. Vermillion Parish Police Jury, 336 So. 2d 986, 989 (Miller,
J., concurring).
28. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is a product of a long, confused, and
much debated legal genesis. For a historical examination of the doctrine, see
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924); Jaffe, Suits Against
Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963); Pugh,
Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REV. 476
(1952). The United States Supreme Court early held that a state was not immune
from suit by a citizen of another state. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793). This
immediately resulted in the proposal and ratification of the eleventh amendment.
Pugh, supra at 484-85. The Court has since left the doctrine intact. E.g. United
States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495 (1940); Hans v. State of Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890);
Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. 122 (1868). Although there are certain qualifica-
tions to the rule requiring waiver of immunity as a prerequisite to suit (Roady, Lee,
Land, Larson, Malone: Sovereign Immunity Revisited, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 1062
(1965), and, in the area of "constitutional torts," ex parte Young 209 U.S. 123
(1908); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) and progeny, the general rule
remains that a state may not be sued without its consent. Schoenbrun, Sovereign
Immunity, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 151 (1965). To avoid the harshness and patent injustice
19771
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to its citizens as Louisiana has under Article 12, Section 10, it should not
then discriminate as to who may have his judgment satisfied. 29 As with the
grant of any right or benefit, the state's actions should become subject to
the requirements of the equal protection clause. Analogous situations
suggest this result. Though states are not compelled constitutionally to
provide for appellate review,30 relief to Indians for historical wrongs, 31
disaster benefits,3 2 or free medical care, 33 such activities once undertaken
are subject to equal protection challenge.3 4 Thus a statute providing for
payment to judgment creditors by the state must not result in unreasonable
classifications among that group of similarly situated persons. 3 Refusal of
payments by the public entity of certain creditors' judgments could create
one class of unsatisfied judgment creditors contrasted to a second class of
judgment creditors to whom payment has been made.3 6 Yet, both classes
are members of the same group, as each individual possesses the determin-
of the doctrine in its theoretical purity, all states and the federal government have,
in one degree or another, waived sovereign immunity legislatively or judicially. W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 at 975 (rev. 4th ed. 1971).
29. Courts have occasionally found related problems such as notice require-
ments and short prescriptive periods unconstitutional denials of equal protection.
Reich v. State Highway Dep't, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972); Turner v.
Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 520 P.2d 879, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1973) ("adequate
state grounds"). See generally Downing & Thehin, The Constitutional Infirmity of
the California Government Claim Statute, 1 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 209 (1974); Com-
ment, The Constitutionality of California's Public Entity Tort Claim Immunity
From Tort Liability, 1973 WASH. U. L. Q. 716 (1973); Note, 60 CORNELL L. REV.
417 (1975).
30. E.g., Meyer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956).
31. Weeks v. United States, 406 F. Supp. 1309 (W.D. Okla. 1975), prob. juris
noted, 96 S. Ct. 2645 (1976).
32. Cf. McCollough v. Redevelopment Auth. of City of Wilkes-Barre, 522 F.2d
858 (3d Cir. 1975).
33. Cf. Gordon v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., Inc., 409 F. Supp. 708
(M.D.N.C. 1976).
34. Cf. Thompson v. Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618 (1967).
35. For an excellent discussion of the system and manner of creating classes,
and the impact thereupon of the equal protection clause, see Tussman & tenBrock,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
36. Hypothetically, if one hundred money judgments were rendered against the
state annually, and the legislature appropriated funds to discharge seventy-five of
the debts, the two classes would be more easily discernible. Moreover, should the
twenty-five unsatisfied judgment creditors be Negro or Chinese and the seventy-
five creditors who have been paid Caucasian, the discrimination would become
blatantly apparent. For an excellent example of a similar situation, see Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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ing characteristic (a judgment against the state) which defines inclusion
within the group.
Current equal protection analysis requires a rational criteria for clas-
sification bearing a reasonable relation to the attainment of a permissible
state objective. 37 Certainly, protection of the public treasury is a permis-
sible objective which will justify the drawing of some classifications even
among judgment creditors.38 However, while refusal to pay Foreman's
judgment might bear some extenuated relationship to the preservation of
the public treasury, such action may be violative of the equal protection
clause when it is arbitrary and not based upon some rational criteria.
The legislature, required to provide for the effect of judgments,
should establish a uniform method for payment of such judgments. 39
Perhaps a ceiling on the amount of recovery by any one plaintiff and a
statutory limitation per occurrence are advisable for protection of the
public treasury.4 ' Mandatory payment under such a system would be
37. Recent court decisions serve as the basis for formulating this statement of
the general equal protection criteria applicable to economic and social legislation.
Cf. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S.Ct. 2562 (1976); City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 96 S. Ct. 2513 (1976); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 96 S.
Ct. 2488 (1976); Village of Bell Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). It is beyond the scope of this note to inquire as
to exactly what the equal protection test is for state action which adversely affects
suspect groups or the exercise of fundamental rights. It is sufficient for this purpose
to note that the present Court has been unwilling to add to the short list of
fundamental rights, (cf. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); San Antonio Ind.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)) and therefore the less demanding
"reasonable relation" test should be applicable in the area of sovereign immunity.
Cf. Note, 52 B.U. L. REV. 202 (1972); Note, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 417 (1975); Note,
1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 716 (1973).
38. The courts have acknowledged that protection of the public treasury and
the integrity of fiscal programs of the states are legitimate state objectives. This
interest of the state, however, will not justify state action which adversely affects
fundamental rights or classes in need of special protection. See Thompson v.
Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618 (1967). As recovery of judgments from a governmental entity
which has waived immunity is not a fundamental right, the test should be less
demanding.
39. Perhaps the legislature should look to the tort claim procedures of the
federal government and sister states for guidance in formulating such legislation.
See FEDERAL TORTS CLAIM AcT. 28 U.S.C. § 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402,
2411, 2412, 2671-80 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (1970) (effect of judgments); 31 U.S.C. (
§ 724(a) (1970); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996 (Deering 1973); COLO. REV. STAT. §§
24-10-101 through 10-117 (1973); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.265-.295 (1975); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.92.010-.92.170;
4.96.101-.96.020; 35.31.00-.285 (1962).
40. The federal government provides for automatic payment of judgments up
to $100,000. 28 U.S.C. § 2414; 31 U.S.C. § 724(a). Several states place limitations
19771
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preferable to the present capricious system. Though still inequitable to
those most seriously injured, similar statutes have survived equal protec-
tion scrutiny elsewhere. 4'
While of little theoretical value, Foreman does serve to question the
ultimate importance of the constitutional waiver of sovereign immunity.
Arbitrary refusal to pay justly adjudicated debts is hardly the result for
which legal scholars campaigned in urging the abrogation of the doctrine.
A desire for governmental accountability and responsibility bred the rev-
olution which vitiated sovereign immunity, and Foreman is a poor vindi-
cation of both policies.
William Hardy Patrick II1
Elrod v. Burns:
CONSTITUTIONAL JOB SECURITY FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES?
Four unclassified employees of the Sheriff's office in Cook County,
Illinois, brought suit in federal court to enjoin their dismissals by the
newly-elected Democrat. Plaintiffs, all Republicans, alleged that their
discharges' were based solely on the fact that they neither supported nor
were members of the Democratic Party and had failed to obtain the
upon recovery against the state, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-113 (1973) ($100,000
per person; $300,000 per occurrence); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.270 (1975) ($100,000 per
person; $300,000 per occurrence; $50,000 damage to property); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19(3) (1970) ($100,000 per person; $300,000 per occurrence;
$100,000 damage to property); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5601 (1972) ($75,000 per
person; $300,000 per negligent act).
41. State of Nevada v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 478 P.2d 591 (1971); cf. Hall v.
Gillens, 13 111.2d. 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958). One court has recently held that
limitations placed upon recovery in malpractice actions are unconstitutional. Wright
v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n. 63 Ill.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976). See Com-
ment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REV.
655 (1976). The rationales are clearly distinguishable because in the malpractice
limitation, a common law right to full recovery was vitiated, whereas in sovereign
immunity, the state creates both the right and the remedy. Its power to limit the
maximum recovery in the right that it creates thereby differs from its power to
abrogate pre-existing common law rights.
1. Three employees had already been discharged while one alleged that he was
in imminent danger of dismissal. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985, 1986, 1988 (1970).
